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Internships have become integral to the development of vocational education in China. This article 
looks into the quasi-employment arrangements of student interns, who occupy an ambiguous space 
between being a student and being a worker at the point of production. Some employers recruit 
interns on their own, while others secure a supply of student labor through coordinated support of 
provincial and lower-level governments that prioritize investments, as well as through subcontracting 
services of private labor agencies. The incorporation of teachers into corporate management can 
strengthen control over students during their internships. While interns are required to do the same 
work as other employees, their unpaid or underpaid working experiences testify that intern labor is 
devalued. Exposés of abuses, such as using child labor in the guise of interns, have pressured the 
Chinese state and companies to eventually take remedial action. Reclaiming student workers’ educa-
tional and labor rights in the growing intern economy, however, remains contested.
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Student internships are typically required to meet educational qualifications 
in the medical profession, the hotel and tourism business, creative industries, 
cultural studies, and many other fields (Perlin, 2012; de Peuter, Cohen, and 
Brophy, 2015). In China, internships are mandatory in secondary and tertiary 
vocational education. This article examines the roles of enterprises, private 
labor agencies, vocational schools, and local governments in recruiting and 
managing student interns. It also seeks to explain the growth of intern labor in 
a changing market facing rising costs and in an environment of educational 
reforms.
Previous research on the commodification of education has shown that, under 
China’s market reforms, vocational schools are incentivized to diversify funding 
sources through expanding student enrolment and engaging in business partner-
ships (Kuczera and Field, 2010). The quality of teaching and learning varies widely. 
Terry Woronov (2016) and Minhua Ling (2015), based on their ethnographic stud-
ies, observe that “passing time” is a way of life among vocational school students 
who no longer face intense academic pressure from exams. In under-resourced 
and poorly governed schools, many students play with handsets and online games, 
read comic books, and even sleep through the ill-prepared lectures, with the disil-
lusioned dropping out altogether. Vocational schools are thus stigmatized as “hold-
ing tanks” for “bad students” who have failed in the mainstream education 
system.
In looking at the school-to-work transition, I focus on the institutional practices 
of student internship programs and the lived experiences of interns. For Guy 
Standing (2011: 16), “internships are potentially a vehicle for channelling youths 
into the precariat.” Is a precarious intern economy comprising young students 
growing in China? Between 2011 and 2012, I interviewed 38 student interns from 
working-class rural migrant families and 14 teachers participating in the intern-
ship program at the Taiwanese-owned Foxconn Technology Group, the largest 
such program in the world. Supplementing fieldwork in Sichuan and Guangdong, 
in August 2016 I interviewed three managers of a private labor agency responsible 
0002921995.INDD   83 1/6/2017   6:24:27 PM
J. Chan / 
Rural China: An International Journal of History and Social Science 14 (2017) 82-10084
for student internships and summer job assignments in Jiangsu. In addition to 
analyzing these first-hand research data, I review the educational and labor 
reforms in student internship governance over the past four decades. I also assess 
the wider consequences of the informalization of labor in the wake of China’s 
regulations on vocational school internships adopted in April 2016.
Labor Informalization in China
Until the early 1990s, graduates from vocational schools, along with their counter-
parts in high schools and colleges, were assigned to state-owned enterprises or the 
collective sector, and hence enjoyed a high level of job security. As market reforms 
and enterprise restructuring deepened, this job assignment system through govern-
ment planning was phased out (Hoffman, 2001). A job seeker is now assumed to 
have full responsibility for his or her own career in China’s competitive environ-
ment. The ethos is centered on individual effort and social mobility, profit maximi-
zation, and organizational efficiency and autonomy (Gallagher, 2005; Harvey, 
2005). Different terms of work and employment, differentiated by one’s educa-
tional credentials and social status, are applied in “flexible” workplaces.
The composition of the Chinese workforce is increasingly heterogeneous and 
labor relations contentious. In Inside China’s Automobile Factories, Lu Zhang (2015) 
showed that the ranks of temporary workers, such as agency laborers and student 
interns, had been growing in step with pressure on the industry to cut costs and 
intensify labor. At assembly factories Zhang surveyed, temps earned a half to two-
thirds of formal employees’ wages and received far fewer welfare benefits. Auto 
production has been further streamlined by the use of lower-cost contingent 
workers on the one hand, and the application of advanced technologies in place of 
human labor on the other hand. Across China the downsizing of the industrial 
labor force is also a product of the government policy favoring a wide spectrum of 
low-end and high-paying service work (Evans and Staveteig, 2009). Interns or 
trainees from vocational schools—who, according to their legal status, remain stu-
dents rather than employees—are a new source of “informal workers” or nonstan-
dard labor in factories, hotels, metro stations, and other workplaces (Smith and 
Chan, 2015; Chan, Pun, and Selden, 2015; Pun and Koo, 2015; Su, 2010; Otis, 2009).
While there are national and international regulations that protect student 
interns’ basic rights and interests in China and in other countries (Brown and 
deCant, 2014), employers frequently ignore them with impunity, as Ross Perlin 
(2012) documents in his Intern Nation, and Greig de Peuter, Nicole S. Cohen, and 
Enda Brophy (2015) comment in their introduction to the tripleC: Communication, 
Capitalism & Critique special issue on “Interrogating Internships.” In what ways are 
student interns rendered as cheap and disposable labor in global electronics pro-
duction chains? Jenny Chan, Ngai Pun, and Mark Selden (2015) draw on their 
ongoing investigation of the labor conditions at Foxconn, the world’s largest elec-
tronics manufacturer, to show the critical role played by Chinese provincial and 
lower-level governments in manipulating internships through direct intervention 
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into school policies. The visible hands of local officials and teachers in charge are 
clearly evident in student mobilization and in-factory management throughout 
the internship period, ensuring worker acquiescence. This active alliance between 
local states, schools, and capital, however, is inherently unstable.
Student interns and their co-workers at the Nanhai-based Honda auto parts 
plant, for example, went on strike between May and June 2010, paralyzing the 
entire close-knit, just-in-time supply network of Honda from within China. Despite 
the power asymmetry between managers and teachers in charge of internships on 
the one side and workers including interns on the other, the strikers, with external 
support from scholars and activists, won a big pay raise (Butollo and ten Brink, 
2012; Chan and Hui, 2014; Lyddon et al., 2015). Students, all classmates and friends 
who went to work by company shuttle buses and lived in the same dormitories, 
supported the worker leaders in solidarity actions. The trade unions at the munici-
pal and higher levels were compelled to mediate the wage disputes to restore 
 production and stability, although they were far more reluctant to accede to work-
ers’ demands for reforming the company union (Friedman, 2014; China Labor 
Bulletin, 2015).
What remains understudied is the complex power structure faced by teenage 
student interns amid the slowing economy, the growing competition for jobs, and 
the collusion between vocational schools, labor agencies, and local governments 
in shaping the internship system. As we will see, employers utilize student labor 
coordinated by local officials as well as by private agencies through labor subcon-
tracting. Inequalities are deepened when the dispatch of student interns by 
schools in cooperation with local governments and labor agencies does not seem 
to serve the learning objectives of the interns at all.
Vocational Education and Student Internships
Vocational schools offer employment-oriented courses for eligible applicants who 
have completed nine years of schooling. Throughout the 1990s, the Chinese govern-
ment’s figures showed that an approximately equal number of students were 
enrolled in secondary vocational schools (grades 10–12) and high schools (Ministry 
of Education, 2015). Figure  1 shows that in the past fifteen years, however, high 
schools have begun to attract a larger number of students than secondary voca-
tional schools nationwide. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, the share 
of secondary vocational school students doubled from 11.7 million in 2001 to 22.4 
million in 2010, but by 2014 it had dropped to 18 million.
Vocational schools follow the work-study model, emphasizing the integration 
of education with production 产教结合 , as laid down in China’s 1996 Vocational 
Education Law. From the perspective of skills training and human capital accumu-
lation, interning—“working for free” or “working for little”—is framed by neolib-
eral policy makers as investing in one’s future. This is somewhat rationalized or 
internalized by the interns themselves, even when the imagined future can be 
highly uncertain (Hope and Figiel, 2015). While many college graduate interns in 
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the United Kingdom and the United States come from “privileged backgrounds” 
(Perlin, 2012), by contrast vocational school student interns in China are mostly 
rural or urban working-class youth (Woronov, 2016). In Shanghai second- 
generation migrant youths are able to build useful social networks during their 
full-time studies and part-time jobs, and may eventually move upward in a 
competitive market economy (Ling, 2015).
For students 中职生 /高职生 , the key question is the quality of teaching in the 
classroom and in internships among a wide range of vocational training programs. 
A standard course lasts from three years (at the secondary level 中专 ) to five years 
(3+2, from the secondary to the tertiary level 大专). A 6,000-student vocational 
school that trains equipment and machinery technicians proclaims its mission:
Master one skill, create a career;
Master one skill, make a blue sky.
学一技之长,创一番事业;
学一技之长,创一片蓝天。
In a larger, 7,000-student school specializing in auto repair and mobile mechanics, 
Zhumadian Higher Technical School (upgraded to Zhumadian Technical Institute 
in 2013), the recruitment brochure elaborates on the importance of “studying real 
skills”:
Figure 1.  Composition of Students in China’s Senior Secondary Schools, 
2001–2014.
Note: The small number of students enrolling in “adult high schools” (between 0.3% and 1.2% of 
the total enrollment) is not shown.
Source: Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic of China, 2015.
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Our country has a good policy that families in difficulty pay no tuition!
To look for a job without learning technical skills is a life-long mistake!
It is best to have a skill in this world, to save you if times get tough!
Parents with foresight have their children learn skills!
Study real skills at Zhumadian Higher Technical School!
Seeking wealth has limits, but skills and know-how lead to riches!
Zhumadian Higher Technical School is a cradle of talent!
Young people who do not learn technical skills will age with terrible regret!
For a technically skilled person, the world is wide open, the benefits last a lifetime!









一技在身 ,走遍天下 ,受益终生 !
打工不养老 ,养老靠技术 !
The school’s marketing campaigns focus on learning skills, which is said to provide 
a solid foundation for career building and lifelong security. It is at this intersection 
of education and economy that the country’s leaders have aspired to nurture a 
skilled labor force through the improvement and expansion of vocational training 
across all levels. One clear, official goal is to recruit up to 23.5 million students into 
three-year vocational schools, that is, 50 percent of the nation’s secondary student 
population, by the year 2020 (Ministry of Education, 2010a: table  1; Ministry of 
Education et al., 2014: table 1).
There are many different forms of internships. Some are chosen by students on 
their own initiative, while others are coordinated by educational institutions on 
students’ behalf as a partial fulfillment of study requirements. Good internship 
programs are participatory, reflective, useful to students’ growth and development, 
and related to their field of study (Ip, 2015). By contrast, my research reveals that 
the interns’ work positions at Foxconn are not related to their field of study.
The Disconnect between Students’ Majors and Internships
The 38 interviewed interns were studying arts, construction, petro-chemistry, auto-
motive repair, herbal medicine, horticulture, secretarial services, computer science, 
business management, accounting, textiles, electronics and mechanics, among oth-
ers. Only eight of them were in their third year, the final year when internships are 
supposed to take place. Their average age was 16.5, just above the national statutory 
minimum working age of 16. In terms of the length of internship, the fourteen 
teachers who were dispatched to Foxconn reveal that the company internships 
0002921995.INDD   87 1/6/2017   6:24:27 PM
J. Chan / 
Rural China: An International Journal of History and Social Science 14 (2017) 82-10088
were often extended to meet production needs, ranging from three months to a full 
year, with scant regard for student training needs.
A 16-year-old Foxconn intern said, “Come on, what do you think we’ve learned 
standing for more than ten hours a day manning machines on the line? What’s an 
internship? There’s no relation to what we study in school. Every day is just a rep-
etition of one or two simple motions, like a robot.” Interns at Foxconn are required 
to work punishing ten to twelve hour shifts, six or seven days a week. The 2007 
Administrative Measures for Internships at Secondary Vocational Schools 中等职
业学校学生实习管理办法  (Ministries of Education and Finance, 2007) states 
that “interns shall not work more than eight hours a day,” and the 2010 Education 
Circular specifies that “interns shall not work overtime beyond the eight-hour 
workday” (Ministry of Education, 2010b). Not only must interns’ shifts be limited 
to eight hours, all their training is required to take place during daytime to ensure 
students’ safety and physical and mental health, in line with the Law on the 
Protection of Minors 未成年人保护法 . The law, revised and promulgated in 
2013, aims to protect young people under 18 through balanced development and 
healthy growth. Article 20 stipulates that schools, including vocational schools, 
shall “cooperate with the parents or other guardians of minor students to guaran-
tee the students’ time for sleeping, recreational activities, and physical exercise 
and may not increase their burden of study.” In reality, Foxconn student interns 
ranging in age from 16 to 18 were subjected to the same working conditions as 
regular workers, including alternating day and night shifts and extensive overtime, 
defying the letter and the spirit of the law.
In explaining the design and purpose of internships, a teacher showed me the 
following school letter addressed to students’ parents 告家长书 :
Participation in this internship will advance students’ respect and appreciation of 
employment 敬业爱岗 , their honesty and integrity 诚实守信  as the main part of a 
vocational moral education 职业道德教育 , will help students understand enterprise 
and become familiar with a business environment and culture, will lead students to 
develop employee awareness 员工意识  in both practice through study and learning by 
doing, will cultivate students’ comprehensive career capabilities 综合职业能力 , and 
will integrate their overall qualities 综合素质  and inure them to hardship and promote 
endurance 吃苦耐劳的精神  so that in the future they will enter the job market with a 
solid foundation.
The letter, with its high moral tone, claims that through the school’s assigned 
 internship students’ “employability” in the market will be enhanced, yet it neither 
specifies the curriculum nor provides any clue to the content of the technical 
training.
A 17-year-old student intern recalled: “I enrolled in an automotive repair course 
in September 2009, and according to the curriculum, the specialized course lasts 
for three years, with two years at school and one year of internship.” But less than 
a year into the program, by June 2010, he and his fellow classmates had been sent 
to Foxconn’s production site based in Shenzhen to intern for seven full months, 
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working not on automobiles but on iPhones. “It’s exhausting. It’s a waste of time,” 
he concluded. Not long after their return, in April 2011, the school began to arrange 
still more internships for graduates. “The school had still not finished planning our 
specialized classes, but they began setting up internship assignments. We haven’t 
yet completed even the core classes in our specialization, nor have we grasped the 
basic skills of automotive repair. How are we going to do an internship in an auto 
company?” The student was very upset. “We followed the rules and paid for three 
years of tuition, but we haven’t completed the professional training. The school 
changed the most basic agreement, contradicted the student recruitment bro-
chure, arbitrarily changed the curriculum, treated its students’ future like a play-
thing, and failed in its responsibility to us. We students have not attained sufficient 
knowledge in our education, and come time for employment, we’ll have no com-
petitive advantage.”
“Consenting” to Internships
The “consent” of students to assigned internships is sometimes open to dispute. In 
my fieldwork, students are sent in bulk by school teachers to undertake so-called 
internship assignments. Some had only a few articles of clothing in coarse rice bags, 
having responded to the school announcement of the internship on short notice. 
One of the students explained what had happened: “Our teacher announced that 
every vocational school in the province had to cooperate with the local government 
and send students to Foxconn to take up internships.” He added, “Unless we could 
present a medical report certified by the city hospital that we were very ill, we had 
to depart immediately.” During the summer of 2010, according to the company’s 
own public statement, 150,000 students were interning at Foxconn. Interns thus 
made up 15 percent of the company’s million-strong workforce across China 
(Foxconn Technology Group, 2010a: 2). This means that Foxconn dwarfed Disney’s 
College Program, often cited as one of the world’s largest internship programs, 
which received more than 50,000 interns cumulatively over thirty years from col-
lege partners in the United States and abroad (Perlin, 2012: 6). In a large Foxconn 
business group that exclusively serves Apple, 28,044 “student interns” from over 
two hundred schools were working on the assembly line in 2010, a six-fold increase 
from 4,539 such interns in 2007 (Foxconn Technology Group, 2010b: 23). With the 
loss of their capacity to control the timing, location, and training content of 
the internships, a student interviewee expressed his pent-up anger by condemning 
the program as “fake internships” 假实习  and “forced internships” 被实习 .
A 26-year-old teacher told me of some students who were reluctant to go to 
work during the first week after they arrived at the Foxconn factory.
I asked my students to manage their emotions. Calm down. Think carefully if you want to 
leave; won’t your parents be disappointed? I visited my students in the dorm to see if they 
felt okay on Tuesday night. They answered “not too bad.” I met them again on Friday 
night. They said “fine.” They’ve gradually gotten used to the work rhythm. Finally, when I 
asked if they want to leave, they replied “no.”
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During the entire internship, the teacher focused on managing his students’ emo-
tions because maintaining a high retention rate of student interns was a primary 
criterion for judging teacher performance. A number of teacher interviewees, as I 
found out later toward the end of the month, pretended that the internships had 
educational and self-management value because they were motivated to get two 
paychecks—one regular monthly salary from their schools and the other from 
Foxconn in direct exchange for their onsite supervisory service during the entire 
internship period. For the school year of 2011–2012, each teacher received an extra 
pay of 2,000 yuan/month from Foxconn. The transposition of teachers’ authority 
into the corporate hierarchical structure was intended to strengthen labor control, 
thus the student interns were serving “two bosses.”
In a broader structure, teachers were pressured to coordinate internships tai-
lored for Foxconn, an influential corporate player in the local political economy. 
Teacher Jiang explained,
There’s a need to respond to the Education Department’s call to get the whole class of 
students organized. To take action uniformly 统一行动 . Because an internship is not a 
summer job 不是打暑假工  that one gets on one’s own. Think about this—if fifty stu-
dents are left in the school during the semester, we won’t be able to take care of them. We 
go with our students to the internship site.
Between September 2011 and January 2012 (a school semester), in Foxconn’s 
Chengdu factories, more than 7,000 students—approximately 10 percent of the 
labor force—were working on the assembly line. One of the participating schools, 
Pujiang Vocational School, sent 162 students on September 22, 2011, to undertake 
three-month internships that were extended in accordance with iPad production 
needs. The large Pengzhou Technical School signed up 309 students, accompanied 
by three male and three female teachers, for the entire internship. This is typical of 
the 1:50 teacher-student ratio maintained throughout the Foxconn internship pro-
gram in 2011–2012.
At Foxconn, student interns are not free to leave work at any time upon reason-
able notice without negative repercussions. Working on the line and living in the 
factory dormitories, the students must comply with the Foxconn internship pro-
gram on pain of not graduating. One Chinese literature teacher in his forties 
observes that the student intern system is not unlike the abusive “contract labor 
system” 包身工  of the 1930s. He draws a parallel to the desperate Occupation-era 
children and teenagers from poverty-stricken villages who were sold to labor con-
tractors and dispatched to toil day and night under harsh conditions in Japanese-
owned cotton mills in Shanghai. Laughing bitterly, he confides that “I’m a modern 
day contractor,” referring to his role as a coordinator of the internship program. 
“My daughter is seventeen years old, my only daughter. She’s now preparing for the 
national college entrance exam. No matter what the result is, I won’t let her come 
to intern, or work, for this company.” Most important, he states that “at Foxconn, 
there’s no real learning through integration of classroom and workshop. The dis-
tortion of vocational education in today’s China is deeply rooted.”
0002921995.INDD   90 1/6/2017   6:24:27 PM
91
J. Chan / 
Rural China: An International Journal of History and Social Science 14 (2017) 82-100
The Devaluation of Intern Labor
Intern labor is cheap labor. In early 2008, during her fieldwork in Nanjing, Terry 
Woronov (2016: 124) found that a whole class of bookkeeping students—still in 
their second year of a five-year vocational program—were brought to a university 
to undertake a two-week unpaid “internship.” The interns were responsible for 
doing nine hours a day of “data entry” at the university’s admission office. She 
reported that most, if not all, of the students “agreed” to do the routine clerical 
work, which was justified by their teachers in charge as “good work experience” that 
nurtured “good discipline.” When young students are socialized to “unthink exploi-
tation,” mainly through the discourse and practice of acquiring hands-on experi-
ence and networking while interning, the relations of labor and the expropriation 
of surplus value are obscured and hidden (Rodino-Colocino and Berberick, 2015).
In Foxconn’s “iPad city” in Chengdu, capital of Sichuan, as of January 2011, 
although new workers and interns were paid the same at 950 yuan/month, interns 
were not entitled to a 400 yuan/month skills subsidy even after they passed a 
three-month probationary period. Foxconn justifies this tiered treatment by refer-
ring to the “pay reasonably for the labor of interns” legal requirement, wherein 
what constitutes “reasonable pay” went unspecified under the national regula-
tions at that time.1
Maintaining that student interns are not employees—even when they perform 
work identical to that of production workers—Foxconn, not unlike many others, 
does not enroll interns in government-administered social security, which covers 
medical insurance, work injury insurance, unemployment benefits, maternity 
insurance, and old age pensions. As of 2015, in Guangdong, employers were sup-
posed to contribute 29.2 percent and employees 11 percent of the employee’s 
wages to social insurance on a monthly basis. For example, the company’s insur-
ance payment should be 876 yuan if the monthly income of a worker is 3,000 yuan 
in total. By dispensing with all of these benefits, the company saves money.
The non-payment of social insurance for interning students deserves attention. 
When the central government promulgated the Social Insurance Law, effective 
July 1, 2011, it required that employers and employees co-contribute to social insur-
ance on a monthly basis, and that premium contribution payments by the com-
pany as well as those by workers be carried forward and portable throughout the 
country. The accumulation and continuity of insurance enrollment is important 
(cumulated up to fifteen years before any disbursement of retirement benefits) 
when labor mobility has become more common. But this is an aspiration that has 
yet to be fulfilled for many employees (Wang and Li, 2011; Chen, 2015; Schmalz, 
Sommer, and Hui, 2016). And student interns—in actuality “student workers” 学
生工—are completely excluded from the government-administered social insur-
ance schemes.
1 Article 8 of the “Administrative Measures for Internships at Secondary Vocational Schools” 中等
职业学校学生实习管理办法  (Ministries of Education and Finance, 2007) stipulates that 
interns be paid at a reasonable level 合理的实习报酬 .
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Labor Dispatch of Student Interns
In the market, labor agencies have increasingly undertaken a new form of labor 
subcontracting: the dispatch of student interns. Some vocational schools had 
engaged with for-profit labor agencies to supply students to workplaces in return 
for economic gains. How is one to make sense of the business model of labor dis-
patch in general and student labor dispatch in particular?
In reviewing the expansion of labor dispatch services in China, Feng Xu (2014) 
points out that the first such agencies were founded by local governments to 
deploy laid-off urban workers before they could foment social disorder. The agen-
cies also created new sources of revenues for officials. Private domestic firms and 
multinationals quickly joined this niche market, absorbing the unemployed, rural 
migrants, and fresh graduates, among other groups (Zhou, 2013). Government sta-
tistics showed that by 2011 there were 27 million (data from the Ministry of Human 
Resources and Social Security) to 60 million (data from the All-China Federation 
of Trade Unions) agency workers—a very wide range of rough estimates at the 
national level (Liu, 2014: 14). As I will explain, student interns are also joining the 
ranks of the fast expanding labor dispatch force.
During August 2016, I conducted preliminary fieldwork at a private labor agency 
in the city of Danyang, Jiangsu 江苏丹阳 . The headquarters of the labor agency 
branch are based in Lianyungang 连云港 , 345 kilometers and four hours by car 
from Danyang. From within Jiangsu, vocational school students—some who were 
born in 2000—were dispatched to small privately run auto parts processing facto-
ries, regardless of their subjects of study. The students were paid an internship 
subsidy 实习补助  of 10 yuan per hour during the summer months (compared to 
the 15.5 yuan local minimum hourly wage standard), with the longest working 
month of 308 hours. The labor agency pocketed the difference between the intern-
ing students’ “standard hourly pay” (that is, 10 yuan per hour) and the factory rate 
(which is negotiated on a case-by-case basis). For the factory boss, the use of dis-
patched or outsourced student workers helps to cut both administrative and labor 
costs (see Figure 2).
Student internships are profoundly marketized. The labor agency, registered in 
2011 as a wholly owned private business, is responsible for the hiring and manage-
ment of student interns, such as the signing of “labor dispatch (hourly work) 
agreements” 劳务派遣  (小时工 ) 协议书 , the payment of wages in cash or via 
bank transfer, and the deduction for commercial insurance fees. According to the 
manager, whom I interviewed, “55 yuan is deducted from each student for the 
monthly insurance premium. But the cheapest general insurance plan costs only 
22 yuan. We maximize our gains by taking the difference, that is, 33 yuan.” Student 
employees of the agency are insured against industrial accidents, but they are not 
entitled to health care or pensions. “Small things like making an advance payment 
of 100 yuan to 200 yuan to the sick and other needy students are helpful in retain-
ing them,” said the manager.
As for the interns, according to an interviewed assistant manager:
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Many want to make some money during the summer holidays and the regular school 
term to support their own studies and everyday expenses, thus reducing the burden on 
their parents. In looking for paid jobs, the students ended up bumping into our labor 
agency through friends’ introductions and online searches. Others have no expectations 
at all about learning or training.
He also commented on the entrepreneurial, rather than educational, role of the 
teachers:
Teachers are interested to getting a cut [from student internships], too. We either have to 
make a good deal, or reach out to students directly through our local agents, whom we call 
downstream suppliers 供货商 , but not via the school teacher gatekeepers. In this way, we 
don’t have to pay them commissions. You know what, meeting with teachers means 
spending on cigarettes, food and drinks, KTVs, and so on. The Mid-Autumn Festival is 
approaching [on September 15] and we’ve got to present them with Maxim’s mooncakes 
美心月饼 . All this will cost you quite a lot before you’ll get any return. The negotiations 
over the distribution of gains, that is, our profits, often take a few rounds, and it’s cumber-
some 很烦 .
In summary, dispatched student interns are treated like a commodity in the human 
resources supply chain. Labor agency managers, unlike school teachers, do not 
seem to even have to defend their trade by talking about ethics, such as self-learning 
or learning by doing, no matter how shallow or hollow the meaning is. As an experi-
ment, the labor agency is now investing and running its first vocational school, 
looking forward to sending the students directly to labor-hungry enterprises in 
return for higher profits.
Regulating China’s Intern Economy
Earl Brown and Kyle deCant (2014: 195) argue that when internship programs are 
“devoid of any relevant educational component and maintained solely for the ben-




Figure 2. The Dispatch of Student Interns through a Labor Agency
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China’s labor laws.” As evidence from research has shown, student interns were 
weakly protected, and I would further argue that the corporate use of these millions 
of informal workers has been driven by China’s rising wages. By 2012, “real wages for 
migrant workers were two and a half times what they had been in 2003, increasing 
by 10.8 percent annually” (Naughton, 2014: 21). There are multiple factors that 
explain this trend. In the mid-2000s, the government moved to abolish the agricul-
ture tax and introduce new social insurance schemes to raise rural incomes in reac-
tion to the widening of the urban–rural income gap that began in the mid to late 
1980s and worsened when China’s joining the World Trade Organization put down-
ward pressure on agricultural prices (Frazier, 2014). In a few localities with good 
infrastructural support, increased opportunities in agricultural and nonfarm work 
are keeping more youthful laborers in their hometowns (Zhan and Huang, 2013). 
For the first time, a shortage of migrant labor has reportedly emerged in coastal 
export zones, and will soon emerge in the booming interior cities too, where inves-
tors are bidding for lower-cost labor, land, and other resources under the Go West 
macro development policy (Pun and Chan, 2012; Chuang, 2015). These factors, plus 
the younger cohort’s frequent jumping from job to job (Shen, 2013; Wang and Zhai, 
2013), compel employers to raise wages to recruit and retain workers. At the same 
time, the central leadership has been raising minimum wages to rebalance the 
economy and to stimulate domestic demand. Government surveys showed that in 
2015, Chinese rural migrant workers’ average wage was 3,072 yuan/month (includ-
ing overtime premiums), a 7.2 percent increase from the preceding year (National 
Bureau of Statistics, 2016: table 8). The government’s regulations against the over-
use of interns are, therefore, generally not observed.
Exposés by media and advocacy groups have shown that Chinese student 
interns—the youngest ones only 14—are thinly disguised child labor, overworked, 
and unguided (BBC, 2012; DanWatch, 2015; Chakrabortty, 2016). In these “sheep-
like internships” 放羊式实习 , interns are confused and helpless, like sheep with-
out a shepherd. In response, in 2016, the central government eventually took some 
measures to protect the basic rights of student interns.
Specifically, vocational schools should manage student internships in accor-
dance with the latest regulations promulgated by the Ministry of Education, the 
Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, the 
State Administration of Work Safety, and the China Insurance Regulatory 
Commission, which superseded the 2007 Administrative Measures and came into 
force on April 11, 2016 (Ministry of Education et al., 2016). Under the “Regulations 
on the Management of Vocational School Student Internships” 职业学校学生实
习管理规定 , the duration of workplace-based internships should normally be 
for six months.2 The minimum level for paying interns is clearly specified: “Wages 
2 Article 10 of the “Regulations on the Management of Vocational School Student Internships” 职
业学校学生实习管理规定  (Ministry of Education et al., 2016) states that internships should 
normally be for six months 学生在实习单位的实习时间根据专业人才培养方案确定 ,顶
岗实习一般为6个月 .
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shall be at least 80 percent of those of employees during the probationary period” 
(italics added).3 On insurance benefits, vocational schools and enterprises are 
required to undertake “joint responsibility” to provide interns with commercial 
general liability insurance.4 Moreover, the regulations, when vigorously imple-
mented, require that student internships have substantial educational content 
and work-skill training provisions, along with comprehensive labor protections for 
student interns such as an eight-hour day, no overtime, and no night shifts.5 Above 
all, no more than 10 percent of the labor force at “any given facility,” or no more 
than 20 percent of the workers in “any given work position,” should consist of stu-
dent interns at any point in time.6
The intricate interests shared by company, labor agency, school, and local gov-
ernments, however, will not be easily done away with. Rob Lederer, the executive 
director of the Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition (EICC), an industry asso-
ciation with a hundred-plus members around the world, acknowledged that “one 
large potential source of reliable, quality labor may be student workers” (EICC and 
REAP, 2015a: 2). At the invitation of the EICC, Scott Rozelle, co-director of the 
Rural Education Action Program (REAP) at Stanford University, has assisted in 
designing a monitoring and evaluation program of China’s vocational schooling 
system since 2013. The major objective is to achieve “responsible vocational edu-
cation,” beginning with a pilot project of 118 secondary vocational schools in heav-
ily populated Henan province (EICC and REAP, 2015a, 2015b). In July 2016, the 
academic research team, with support from leaders from the provincial 
Department of Education, created a list of 22 credentialed vocational schools to 
benchmark teaching standards, school resources, and student learning experi-
ences against a set of criteria (EICC and REAP, 2016).
The provincial government encouraged companies to select students and grad-
uates from quality schools for internships and employment, thereby providing 
economic incentives for both teachers and students to improve their performance. 
Cooperating schools were also promised increased government funding for long-
term educational development. This is framed by the Stanford University research 
team as a “win-win-win action research” to strengthen collaboration between the 
government, schools, and companies (Rozelle, Loyalka, and Chu, 2013). In engag-
ing with the world’s largest electronics association, the researchers took aim at 
3 Article 17 (Ministry of Education et al., 2016) stipulates that interns shall be paid “at least 80 
percent of the employees’ wages during the probation” 不低于本单位相同岗位试用期工资标
准的80%, and the wages shall be fully paid in local currency without delay 以货币形式及时、足
额支付给学生 .
4 Article 35 (Ministry of Education et al., 2016) emphasizes the shared responsibility of vocational 
schools and enterprises to insure student interns against work-related injuries and death 为实习学
生投保实习责任保险 .
5 Article 16 (Ministry of Education et al., 2016) prohibits employers from lengthening the workday 
and assigning night work to student interns 不得安排学生加班和夜班 .
6 Article 9 (Ministry of Education et al., 2016) sets the legal limits on the use of student interns at 
the level of the work position and the workplace 顶岗实习学生的人数不超过实习单位在岗
职工总数的 10%, 在具体岗位顶岗实习的学生人数不高于同类岗位在岗职工总人
数的20%.
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vocational schools, holding them accountable for bad learning experiences and 
poor internship arrangements. They have not, however, addressed the managerial 
abuses involving the violation of China’s internship provisions at the workplace 
level.
Conclusion
Greig de Peuter, Nicole Cohen, and Enda Brophy (2015: 331) indicate that intern-
ships are “an entry point for interrogating contested conditions of life, labour, and 
learning at a historical moment when precarity is an encroaching structure of feel-
ing.” Young and inexperienced students, along with many other kinds of low-skilled 
workers, face formidable challenges in the face of credential inflation, ineffective 
governance, and the flexibilization of production of services and goods around the 
globe (Kuruvilla, Lee, and Gallagher, 2011; Huang, 2011; Standing, 2011; Warhurst et 
al., 2012; Chan and Selden, 2016; Lee, 2016). “Unification of school and business, 
unification of theory and practice, unification of teacher and technician, and unifi-
cation of student and employee” 学校企业一体化 ,理论实践一体化 ,教师师
傅一体化 ,学生员工一体化  proclaims a school mission statement. Instead of a 
seamless unification, this article concludes that the discrepancy between promise 
and reality could scarcely be larger.
Ross Perlin in his book on contemporary American and European internship 
practices, Intern Nation, comments, “The very significance of the word intern lies 
in its ambiguity” (Perlin, 2012: 23, italics in the original). In China, student interns 
have become an important source of labor that is growing in step with the expan-
sion of vocational education and the informalization of employment. The hopes 
that internships will lead to careers are being systematically undermined by prac-
tices that sabotage the fundamental concept of internships in order to assure 
employers a cheap and disposable labor supply. Facing financial and political pres-
sures, many schools—even the better ones—are unable to shield students from 
internships that violate the law.
At a time of slowing growth and an ageing population, the growing numbers of 
young, vocationally trained workers could play a critical role in China’s economic 
and technological development. The strengthening of labor laws and internship 
regulations is an attempt by the authoritarian state to boost its legitimacy. Yet with 
each loophole that the government closes, corporations react by circumventing 
the new rules and regulations. Eli Friedman and Ching Kwan Lee (2010: 513) 
insightfully comment that, at the workplace level, multitiered employment 
arrangements are “problematic not just from the perspective of the informal work-
ers, but also from [that of] the regular workers, who will find it increasingly diffi-
cult to make collective demands on their employers.” Worse still, provincial and 
lower-level governments have bent the laws and regulations to attract investment 
and accelerate inland relocation, at the expense of workers’ rights and interests. 
Stronger protection of labor, particularly student workers, will require much more 
sustained joint efforts from the state, companies, and civil society.
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